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In October 1991, the renowned cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Loftus travelled 
back from Atlanta airport with a companion. During the course of their 
conversation, Loftus speculated on the design of an experiment that might 
demonstrate the existence of the phenomenon of suggestibility in memory recall. 
Two weeks later the experiment was attempted informally, at a party. Next came 
a classroom exercise. Eventually the procedure was formally conducted, with the 
appropriate ethical approvals in place, and finally published as The formation of 
false memories (Loftus & Pickerell, 1995)1. 
 
The experiment became known as the ‘lost in the shopping mall’ study. It goes 
something like this: the researcher (Loftus) recruits a confederate (Jim) who has 
a younger sibling (Chris).  Jim interacts with Chris in the course of which he asks 
Chris ‘Do you remember the time when you got lost in that shopping mall?’; an 
event that, according to Jim (and Jim’s and Chris’s mother; and thus Loftus) 
never occurred. Eventually, after more interactions, Chris agrees that he did 
indeed get lost in the mall; moreover, he elaborates on the details. In the final 
stage Chris is debriefed and becomes disappointed and doubtful on learning that 
the memories he has recollected are ‘false’. 
 
The ‘lost in the mall’ study has been a crucial intervention in the controversy 
around the existence of ‘recovered memories’, or, alternatively, of ‘false 
memories’. This controversy is sometimes referred to as the ‘memory wars’ 
(Campbell, 2002). The central object of the controversy is the testimony given by 
adults who recall in later life earlier episodes of sexual violence and abuse 
inflicted upon them in their childhood despite having not clearly recalled these 
episodes previously. For one side, mostly made up of clinical psychologists, 
therapists, and survivor activist groups, ‘recovered memories’ are brought about 
by the psychic dissociation suffered by victims in the course of abuse. This 
decoupling of mental and emotional processes is a drastic strategy that allows 
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the victim to cope with the trauma of betrayal and abuse, but results in severe 
disruption to the storage and retrieval aspects of memory (Freyd, 1996). For the 
other side, dominated by experimental psychologists and activist groups of 
accused parents and survivors who have ‘retracted’ their previous testimony, 
‘false memories’ are created under the influence of therapists who use ‘child 
sexual abuse’ as master narrative to interpret even the most mundane of 
symptoms reported by clients during the course of therapy. Therapists are 
viewed as having a self-interested stake in assisting victims to secure legal and 
financial recompense from their abusers, which is presumed to fund yet further 
therapy (Ofshe & Watters, 1994). 
 
There is a great deal which has been said and which could be said now about the 
recovered/false memory debate (one of the most compelling and lucid analysis 
comes from Sue Campbell (2002; 2014), whose untimely passing was an 
enormous loss to memory studies).  But the key issue of us here is the extent to 
which debates that turn on contested ontologies of memory have perhaps a 
greater pertinence and social relevance today than at the time of Matter and 
Memory and Bergson’s subsequent reflections on memory in the 1911 Oxford 
lectures on The Perception of Change. The problems that Bergson so incisively 
identified with the psychological thinking of his contemporaries – namely their 
inability to distinguish between perception and representation – remain our 
problems. Indeed the communities who share in the struggle around the 
ontology of memory now stretches far beyond the audience Bergson might have 
anticipated. The questions that Bergson addresses in may be primarily 
metaphysical matters but they are matters in which a great many of us now have 
a real practical stake. 
 
Let’s take one of the problems that Bergson deals with extensively in Matter and 
Memory and revisits in The Perception of Change. The psychology of memory has 
from its very inception depended on the logic of separating memory into a series 
of distinct processes. One process involves the retention and conversion of 
ongoing perception into stored memories – i.e. storage. The reverse process 
concerns the recollection of stored memories into cognitions that then have a 
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role in structuring perception and action – i.e. retrieval. What unites these 
processes into a dynamic system is a central set of executive processes – 
sometimes called ‘working memory’, sometimes more ambitiously ‘the self’ – 
that have the role of coordinating the downward stream of memorialisation and 
the upward stream of recollection.  
 
Experimental investigation of storage and retrieval classically takes the form of 
presenting participants with stimuli that they are then asked to recall at a later 
point. Manipulating the conditions under which storage and retrieval occur can 
reveal some of the dynamic properties of the cognitive system. The intelligibility 
of the experiment depends upon being able to clearly demarcate time such that 
the point of storage (t1) is clearly distinct from the point of retrieval (t2). 
However this tends to encourage the view that at t1 and t2 the cognitive system 
is engaged in very different states – it is ‘storing’ and one point and ‘retrieving’ at 
another. Yet if perception is being continuously stored as memory then t1 and t2 
are not really separate processes. If memory is ‘always on’ then this implies that 
we are recollecting as we store and storing as we recollect (Lansdale, 2005). 
More problematically it also implies that that each of these mixed psychic events 
is also being stored. There ought, logically, to be a memory of each perceptual 
event infused by memory (t1n) and of each recollection surging into perception 
(t2n) – ‘I remember when I first recollected that his eyes were a vivid blue’. 
These ‘second order’ memories would, of course, be subject to a further set of 
memorializing and recollecting processes, and so on ad infinitum. 
 
We can recognize this is as having family resemblance to the category of 
problems that Bergson relates to Zeno of Elea’s Paradoxes. These Bergson 
glosses as involving ‘the confusion of movement with the space covered, or at 
least the conviction that one can treat movement as one treats space, divide it 
without taking account of its articulations’ (1992: 144). In the present case the 
confusion here is between the dynamics of recollection and a spatialized 
conception of the temporal envelope in which it is taken to occur. This confusion 
is further compounded when the cognitive system is itself divided into a spatial 
order that makes the separation between the moment of storage and the 
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moment of retrieval into a set of distinct entities (i.e. components of the same 
system). It suffices to recall here the lyrical turns of phrase at the start of the 
second lecture with which Bergson shows mock incredulity at the errors of 
thought which follow from reducing time to space – ‘How can the movement be 
applied upon the space it traverses? How can something moving coincide with 
something immobile? How could the moving object be in a point of its trajectory 
passage?’ (1992: 143). Experimental studies of memory assume that there is a 
thing – the cognitive system – that is ‘in’ time, here understood as a succession of 
instants. The experimental problem is to index the state of the system at each 
desired instant and relate it to successive instants. In this way changes in state 
are applied to a spatialized time in the hope that properties of the cognitive 
system will be clarified, despite the tendency of this procedure to produce a 
Cantor Dust of intervening states which make the apparent line between 
perception and recollection infinitely convoluted. The arrow will never reach its 
target. Or as Bergson has it ‘we argue about movement as though it were made of 
immobilities and, when we look at it, it with immobilities that we reconstitute it. 
Movement for us is a position, then another position, and so on indefinitely’ 
(1992: 145). 
 
Such confusion would be deeply amusing were the stakes not quite so high. Both 
sides in the memory wars controversy are locked into a debate about the 
putative spatial properties of memory that would render plausible their view of 
the accuracy or not of recollection of child sexual abuse. For example, Bessel van 
der Kolk (2014) has argued that traumatic memories are stored in a different 
way to other kinds of memories. Trauma is encoded as a series of sensations that 
are juxtaposed with one another rather than as an episodic memory with a clear 
narrative structure. Traumatic memories are therefore better characterized as 
‘body memories’ that are stored in a different manner and in a different place by 
cognitive and neurological processes2. Speaking from the opposed side, cognitive 
psychologists such as Loftus have poured scorn on the idea that there are ‘special’ 
unique processes involved in traumatic memories. There is a single overarching 
management of memory within the cognitive system (and hence within the brain 
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itself), and this management structure is the sole referent that is worthy of 
debate.  
 
The rival sides here follow in a longstanding tradition within psychology to 
identify processes with distinct structures that are ultimately reducible to 
spatially organized brain states. One of the earliest conjectures in the psychology 
of memory is that it is possible to study the organization of memories as 
‘engrams’ that are archived within the brain (see Sutton, 1998 for an account of 
the broader philosophical backdrop). The ‘misplaced concresence’ involved in 
this conjecture is readily apparent. What spatial form would these engrams take? 
What kind of capacity would the brain require to be capable of a continuous self-
archiving and administration of perception in this way? These kinds of questions 
echoed through the development of the psychology of memory in the twentieth 
century. The cognitive system was taken to be under constant threat of being 
overwhelmed the sheer volume of perceptual data it was considered to have to 
manage. The mind of cognitive psychology was treated as continuously at risk of 
drowning in the ‘torrent-like flow of things’ (p.150) that it encounters through 
perception. The ‘standard model’ of cognition is then built around the dual 
assumptions of the limited capacity of mind and the necessity of abstracting 
concepts from perception as a defence against the tsunami of perception. Mind 
must convert the world into concepts or else risk a swamping of its capacity to 
self-archive. 
 
Let’s look further at the way Bergson anticipates these problems in The 
Perception of Change. Speaking of a ‘doctrinal position’ at work in the psychology 
of his time, Bergson attributes the influence of a ‘certain metaphysics’. It would 
not be incorrect to assert that contemporary psychology certainly remains under 
the influence to this day. Bergson’s argument against the storage or self-
archiving view of memory first invokes the problem of capacity – a problem he 
considers to ‘postpone’ the overarching paradox of approaching mind through 
spatial categories. He leaves us with the image of the projectionist inside the 
screening room who is being buried under the weight of endless spools of 
‘cinematographic film’ that they are desperately attempting to organize. A truly 
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pointless exercise – ‘Let us suppose all those images are stored up; what good 
will they serve? Which one shall we use? Let us grant that we have our reasons 
for choosing one of them, why, and how, shall we throw it back into the past 
when we perceive it?’ (p.154).  
 
The bite in Bergson’s argumentative switch from a metaphysical to a pragmatic 
argument is worth noting. One year later, in 1912, John Broadus Watson would 
publish his manifesto for operationalism – ‘Psychology as a Behaviorist views it’, 
which would promote a kind of economic rationalization as the ‘doctrinal 
position’ for the analysis of psychological problems. Whilst this form of 
psychology would certainly have no truck with the image of a ‘theatre of 
perception’, it would nevertheless reproduce the storage problem in terms of the 
retention within the organism of the enormous patterns of stimulus-response 
that shape behaviour. Bergson’s argument emphasizes that thinking this process 
in spatial terms is incoherent with respect to the utility-maximisation because it 
again implies the weight of the past needs to amassed in some place (or other).  
 
Bergson does of course allow psychologists the dignity of their illusions. Nothing 
could be more natural than to reduce the perception-remembering circuit to 
spatial terms, since fitting a process to a mobile, to a thing which changes is a 
tendency that is supported by vision as the sense ‘par excellence’ (p.147). 
Memory would then consist of a set of states which mind, considered as a thing, 
enters into. However, as Takuya Nagano (this volume) observes, collapsing the 
psychological with material in this way is antithetical to Bergson’s project. He 
very clearly saw the difference between physical vibration and psychological 
memory, although, as Nagano observes, from a mereological perspective, it is 
possible to posit a linkage through conceptualising a continuant which traverses 
matter and memory treated as occurrents. 
 
From a psychological perspective, much turns on how memorial ‘states’ are 
conceived. In Cosmopolitics, Isabelle Stengers offers an incisive critique of the 
loose-limbed way of defining a state that we find in the greater part of the 
psychology of memory. Mathematically, the notion of a state has some utility 
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when it is operationalised as a ‘state function’ that describes a system, along with 
the possibility of deducing future changes in state. But to use the notion to 
simply refer to a set of measurements amongst which there is no clear 
relationship, in other words as a garbage can into which are poured all of the 
phenomenon currently amenable to measurement in the hope that some kind of 
conceptual unity is thereby implied is, Stengers observes, clearly nonsensical. We 
might say that this vice of attributing states to psychological processes repeats 
the error Bergson identifies of unwarranted spatialisation creating entities or 
mobiles whose qualities end up becoming more complex and byzantine than the 
phenomenon they have been created to explain. We see this in the ‘boxology’ of 
cognitive models of memory, where the failure of a model to explain a given 
dataset is corrected by inventing further ‘boxes’ of processes, such that the 
model becomes more complex than the world it is supposed to explain – the map 
is enlarged to become bigger than the territory. 
 
Bergson’s argument throughout Matter & Memory is that this tendency towards 
entitative or ‘state’ thinking reflects at one level what is most natural in our 
thinking when we are driven by the need to secure a foothold in the world. The 
abstraction of change and process in the form of a thing that changes has some 
purpose in co-ordinating and securing the grounds on which we act – ‘At a 
certain point I realized that the mood in the room was turning against me’. In The 
Perception of Change, Bergson is slightly more generous and allows that it is not 
merely a matter of our baser instincts that leads to misplaced concesence, but 
also the progressive development of scientificity that will give us the courage to 
give up on the desire to fit mobility to a mobile as we become increasingly aware 
of the complexity of the physical world. I fear that the history of psychology in 
the intervening years has proved that his generosity was misplaced. When 
debate in the memory wars comes down to a question of where in the brain we 
ought best to place trauma it is surely time to admit the progressive capacity to 
measure more things will not be the route to our salvation. 
 
Ought we then to conclude that Bergson has no relevance for contemporary 
Psychology? On the contrary, I would argue strongly that the problems that 
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Bergson identified are now becoming particularly acute within the discipline. Let 
me risk the cliché that now, more than ever, Bergsonism is entirely what is 
needed to renew the psychology of memory. Let me offer three brief 
illustrations: 
 
1. There is now a shared consensus around the idea that all psychological 
memory is reconstruction (see Conway & Loveday, 2015). Whilst this 
represents a colossal shift from the storage-retrieval model that has 
hitherto dominated the psychology of memory, it opens up a whole series 
of questions which psychologists are singularly ill-equipped to address. Is 
‘the psychological’ then principally concerned with current matters at 
hand, in such a way that memory consists of purely projecting the 
demands of present actions into the past? What is the status of what is 
reconstructed – can we make of the past whatever we like based on our 
current needs? How can a past that is irreversibly ‘gone’ remain part of 
the present? It is here that Bergson’s unique qualitative formulation of 
duration in relation to spatiality is crucial – the past may no longer 
directly ‘act’ on the present, but it has not really passed. So the question 
for psychologists is not around interpretation or a semiotic 
reconstruction of the past, but rather of the ways in which duration 
affords a topological re-organisation of matter. As Anne Lefebvre (this 
volume) demonstrates in her discussion of Gilbert Simondon, the 
psychological is best articulated as a concern with individuation within a 
field rather than some notion of progressive states attributed to a given 
entity. 
2. The clarity with which Bergson demonstrates that perception and 
memory cannot be understood in a representational framework in any 
straightforward way is clearly challenging for a discipline that has set its 
conceptual roots in just such a framework. Nevertheless, whilst it would 
be premature to claim that psychology is susceptible to ‘non-
representational’ arguments (although see Brown & Stenner, 2009), there 
is an increasing concern with the ‘function’ or ‘action-orientation’ of 
memory that is shared across experimental and 
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qualitative/phenomenological approaches within the discipline (see 
Brown & Reavey, 2018). Remembering is an activity that expands and 
transforms our ‘foothold’ in the present rather than an attempt at the 
preservation of the past. But this shift towards a pragmatic conception of 
memory raises some uncomfortable psychological questions – what then 
is the relationship between the temporal, as the source of identity and 
continuity in being, and the spatial, as the immediate causal nexus in 
which our actions are embedded? The responses usually involve recourse 
to one of the many dualisms that psychologists rely upon – mind/body; 
person/social; long term memory/working memory etc. A better starting 
point might perhaps be in the tension that Frederic Worms (this volume) 
identifies between the vital and the critical in Bergson, that is, between 
the liberty of invention, and the grounding in oppositions and relations. In 
work with Paula Reavey, we have explored how ambiguity is a powerful 
resource in remembering (see Brown & Reavey, 2015). Persons who have 
experienced difficult or traumatic events often have recollections that do 
not make sense to them, things do not really ‘add up’. For example, events 
may be recollected out of sequence, actions may seem lacking in 
intentionality. But at the same time, they feel often feel a pull to resolve 
and make sense of their memories. It is this tension between felt 
experience and meaning – the vital and the critical – that defines living 
with a difficult past. We try to start our analyses in the middle of that 
tension rather than apportion it to one pole or the other. 
3. Psychologists have often opposed their approach to memory to social 
approaches. The latter are usually identified with Maurice Halbwachs’ 
classic work on collective memory (1980; 1992). Halbwachs has been 
much misunderstood with the Anglophone world, with the interpretation 
of collective memory as equivalent to some kind of ‘group mind’ having 
taken root long ago. This has been compounded by an introductory essay 
by Mary Douglas (1980) that stresses the opposition between Halbwachs 
and Bergson as a difference between a sociological functionalism and a 
psychological mysticism. Together with David Middleton, we have tried to 
argue to the contrary that the notion of experience which is developed in 
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Halbwachs work cuts across any straightforward distinction between the 
individual and the collective, and that, moreover, when this is understood 
in relation to Bergsonian durée, the link between individual and collective 
experiences of the past, and the interdependency between our memory 
and that of others, becomes clearer (Middleton & Brown, 2005). Rather 
than study remembering as an isolated act, our attention should be drawn 
to the ‘polyrhythms’ formed by intersecting duration, in the way that 
Yasuhiko Murakami (this volume) has suggested. We see Halbwachs and 
Bergson as united in a productive tension, as thinkers who together set a 
revised agenda for the psychology of memory. 
 
Let me conclude by returning to the question of false memory. Bergson’s 
description of a ‘state’ in The Perception of Change remains instructive – ‘when 
the two changes, that of the object and that of the subject take place under 
particular conditions, they produced the particular appearance that we call a 
‘state’. And once in possession of ‘states’, our mind recomposes change with 
them’ (p.146). A state, that is to say an abstraction or a patterning of the 
relationship, is what holds between subject and object. It is not produced by the 
subject, nor is it inherent in the object. We might say that insofar as the 
psychology of memory has to do with states then these are arrangements of 
subjects and objects, emergent effects of certain kinds of patternings. Now we 
can understand perfectly well how, as Bergson claims, these states can be 
elevated to a higher order of abstraction by a subject who claims or lives out the 
state as though it were reality itself. This is akin to the passenger on the train 
who reaches out their hand to a fellow passenger on a passing train in the false 
belief that the trains are not moving at the same speed but are actually stationary. 
What deserves to be called a ‘psychological state’ is then this movement where 
one duration grasps another such that an apparent stability is created. This 
coming together of durations can be used as means of turning around on one’s 
own duration but this does not render it as a personal property or as the product 
of a bounded subjectivity. 
 
 11 
Returning now to Lost in the Mall, Jim persuades his brother that he was once 
lost in the shopping mall as a child. Chris comes, apparently, to believe this. LIM 
predicts that Chris will include the false event suggested to him by Jim to 
produce a different story about their joint past. But it does so without taking into 
account anything about their relationship so far, other than the effects of the 
suggestion procedure itself, as though this were something like a chemical 
reaction rather than one interaction situated with respect to the broad and deep 
history shared by two brothers. The experiment hypothesises that a given state 
of affairs will come about (the participant will recall something that did not 
happen), irrespective of the particular circumstances in which the experiment is 
conducted (a party, a classroom, a laboratory) and the specific unfolding of the 
interaction between the confederate and the participant. LIM seeks to abolish 
time and place in the name of predicting a determinate change in the subjective 
qualities of its target participant – Chris will develop a false belief. 
 
But time and place are entirely what is at stake here in the constitution of a 
psychological state that implicates the durations of the two brothers. In asking 
his brother to recall an event from their shared history, Jim asks Chris to turn 
around on his own past from the ‘state’ that is formed by their respective 
durations being co-ordinated through the time of the experiment.  It is the 
peculiar timing of the experiment – being asked ‘do you remember?’ and then 
being invited to fit ones duration into the intelligibility of the sequence of 
questions that follows – that brings the two brothers together like the 
passengers on moving trains.  
 
Jim and Chris are hooked into one another’s duration. Each depends upon the 
time of the other. Jim is made to wait until Chris comes to affirm the false 
memory. Chris is made to wait in whatever he is doing by Jim’s insistence that 
they discuss this particular episode from their childhood. What is in fact crucial 
to LIM is this simple fact of Jim & Chris’s shared childhood. It is because Jim’s 
duration, his lived time, includes that of Chris that he is able to discuss the 
childhood episode. It is less that they share a common duration, than that their 
durations are overlapping, interdependent with one another. But Jim’s folding of 
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Chris’s duration into his own is not a greeting, like the train passengers, a mutual 
envelopment of one duration by another. It is a form of betrayal. Jim is 
attempting to discredit Chris’s relationship to his own past. 
 
LIM is then an extremely important experiment for the psychology of memory, 
and for the ‘memory wars’ themselves. It tells us about the complexities of 
relations and the ways in which memory, as duration comes to be ‘inserted’ into 
the present. Our foothold in the present is always limited, selective. As such it is 
structured by the relations we have to others and the forms of mediation that 
allow us to extract or abstract the bits of the world that appear most useful to us. 
This is accomplished relationally in tandem with others. Chris struggles to make 
sense of the peculiar circumstances in which he finds himself through interaction 
with his brother, and with the setting itself. Both of them turn around on their 
past, on their individual durations, which overlap and envelop one another. 
Again, this is a relational matter – how does our past show up when it is 
juxtaposed what that of another, when my experience becomes folded into yours 
and yours into mine, in a kind of grasping, enveloping, intensifying and 
unfolding?  
 
I propose that this kind of attention to the relational constitution of memory 
through co-ordinating mutual, overlapping durations offers a way forward 
through some of the self-made paradoxes in the psychology of memory that 
came so dramatically to the fore in the memory wars. How is that someone can 
remember something in therapy that did not remember in the same way 
previously? How can such emergent memories be treated by the legal system? 
Following Bergson, we may define the psychological states involved in memory 
as the constitution of apparent stability from the overlapping of durations, such 
that a selective turning around on a jointly produced manifold of pasts becomes 
possible. The turning around or mobilization of memory accomplished in 
therapy is not then reducible to personal reflection or the exploration of a 
subjectively defined past. It is rather a jointly accomplished work of holding 
together several different durations, which expand and overlap with one another, 
including the time of the therapeutic encounter. When the client is asked to offer 
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testimony in court based on what may have occurred during therapy, what 
happens is not the repetition of the process but rather a holding together of a 
very different set of durations, with different timings and relations. Hence the 
psychological state jointly produced in therapy is not the same as that produced 
in court. The error is to consider it possible to abstract the state from the 
relations and durations in which it is constituted and to seek an equivalence 
between states across settings (see Brown & Reavey, 2019 for an extended 
argument). Now it may be that to think the relations between these setting-
specific psychological states requires a more complex image than that of passing 
trains, but in restoring a sense of mobility inherent to any version of the 
psychological, Bergson makes it possible to hope still for a psychology that could 
overcome the limitations he so acutely identified in 1911. 
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1 For a fuller analysis of this episode, see Ashmore, Brown & MacMillan, 2005, 
and for a broader discussion of false memory research see Brown & Reavey, 
2017. 
2 The idea of ‘body memory’ has been taken up in an entirely different way by the 
phenomenologist Thomas Fuchs, who has provided an extensive treatment of 
how habits and bodily practices structure memory within an enactive cognition 
framework (see Fuchs, 2012; 2017) 
